What happened in Moscow?
The 8th Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan took place in Moscow on 5 October 2026. Special representatives/senior officials from Afghanistan (led by Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi), Russia, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan participated in the consultation. Belarus and Egypt attended as guests. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov opened the meeting.
Participants reaffirmed support for equal, mutually beneficial cooperation with Kabul and Afghanistan’s economic integration, and called for non-politicised humanitarian aid. However, the meeting ended without a joint statement — the first such failure in the format’s history. The deadlock stemmed from disagreement between the Afghan and Pakistani delegations over wording linking Afghanistan to terrorism (the Afghan side objected to language it found excessive; Pakistan highlighted ongoing cross-border terror threats). Russian envoy Zamir Kabulov expressed regret but said the format would continue as a regional coordination platform. In short: Regional engagement continued, but Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions blocked consensus.
What does Russia think about the Afghan Taliban?
Russia recognised the Afghan Taliban government in Afghanistan. Zamir Kabulov (Russian Presidential Special Representative for Afghanistan) stated in May 2025 (RIA Novosti interview): “We see and appreciate the efforts that the Taliban are making in the fight against the Afghan wing of ISIS. We will provide our best assistance to the authorities of Afghanistan through specialised structures.” He explicitly called ISKP a “common enemy” of Russia and Afghanistan. So Russia fully supports and endorses the Afghan Taliban regime.
What do China and Pakistan think about the Afghan Taliban?
Both China and Pakistan demanded full action against terror outfits including ISKP, TTP, ETIM, and other Central Asian militant organisations. Pakistan has closed its more than 2000 kilometer border with Afghanistan, and relations between Islamabad and Kabul are extremely tense over the issue.
What happened after the Moscow Format Meeting?
Russia suddenly enhanced its engagement in the region. For the first time in recent history, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev made a four-day visit (12–15 October) — the first by a Russian Interior Minister. He met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and other leaders. The two sides signed an MoU on cooperation against organised crime and discussed security, counterterrorism, and economic ties. At the same time, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service chief Sergei Naryshkin visited Kabul and met Afghan intelligence chief Abdul Haq Wasiq.
On the other hand, Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Aleksandr Venediktov visited New Delhi (around 14 October) for the 7th round of the India-Russia Special Mechanism on Pakistan and Afghanistan. He co-chaired talks with Deputy NSA Pavan Kapoor and also met NSA Ajit Doval. A Russian delegation visit to Iran followed. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Tehran on 19 October. He held talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, focusing on the bilateral strategic partnership, regional security (including the Gulf crisis), and coordination on Afghanistan-related issues. These engagements suggest Russia is anticipating threats.
What are the Russian fears?
Despite Russian support and recognition of the Afghan Taliban, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (16 October 2026, CSTO-CIS-SCO Conference on Security in Central Asia and Afghanistan) stated:
“We are trying to remain realistic and are fully aware of the fact that overcoming the grim two-decade-long legacy of inglorious occupation of Afghanistan by the United States and other NATO countries will take a long time. … According to available information, a significant presence of terrorist and extremist groups, along with their training camps and strongholds, remains in Afghan areas bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. … The main threat comes from the Wilayat Khorasan group (ISKP). This regional offshoot of the international terrorist organisation Islamic State openly seeks to undermine the Kabul government’s ability to maintain stability in that country. Concurrently, the radicals want to use Afghanistan as a launching pad for taking terrorist activity to Central Asia and Russia.”
But what else does Russia warn of?
Russian officials have issued clear and recent warnings against any return of US or NATO military presence/infrastructure to Afghanistan.
Sergey Lavrov (5 October 2026, 8th Moscow Format consultations) expressed: The deployment of NATO military infrastructure in Afghanistan or neighbouring countries under any pretext is “categorically unacceptable” / “absolutely unacceptable.” He warned that historical experience shows such a presence risks destabilisation and escalating conflict, noting that “we have seen no other outcome from this kind of presence over the past several decades.”
Another Russian leader, Sergey Shoigu (Security Council Secretary, around 5–6 October 2026), expressed: Western statements about a possible return of US and NATO military infrastructure and facilities to Afghanistan are “absolutely unacceptable.” He added: “Apparently, history has taught them nothing.”
While Alexander Venediktov (Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 12–13 October 2026) mentioned: The United States has not concealed its plans to restore military infrastructure in Afghanistan. “The emergence of such a foothold would pose a direct threat to all countries in the region.” He said Russia’s security dialogue with Kabul is partly aimed at preventing the return of military infrastructure belonging to countries outside the region.
Our Assessment:
What’s next?
By closely monitoring regional dynamics through both historical lenses and current ground realities, NSBRRI experts assess that Russia harbours a mix of genuine security concerns and certain misperceptions regarding Afghanistan. The situation on the ground does not fully align with Moscow’s prevailing perceptions, suggesting a degree of strategic confusion in Russia’s approach toward Kabul.
Russia correctly recognises the continued presence of transnational militant groups in Afghanistan — a reality that cannot be denied. However, the expectation that the Afghan Taliban are both willing and capable of comprehensively dismantling these networks appears overstated. Historical precedent from the late 1990s shows that the original Taliban leadership refused to sever ties with such groups. Deep-rooted bonds of faith, ideological affinity, and a sense of brotherhood continue to link significant segments of the Taliban with many of these outfits. Even if the Iran war escalates, the theatre of war may extend to Afghanistan. During the US-led NATO presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly supported the Afghan Taliban and even Al Qaeda leadership.
The Taliban’s particular hostility toward ISKP is primarily driven by sharp theological and ideological differences rather than a broader strategic commitment to eliminate all non-state armed actors. In contrast, the more immediate and structural threats confronting the Taliban regime are internal. Mounting socio-political and economic pressures, the return of millions of refugees (including large numbers of unemployed youth), the lingering presence of armed proxies with access to substantial weapons stockpiles worth billions of dollars, and the availability of a frustrated youth population for recruitment constitute far more serious challenges to regime stability.
On the security front, Taliban forces largely retain a guerrilla organisational structure and continue to rely on irregular tactics when confronting opposition elements. Against this backdrop, there are growing indicators of potential sudden internal security shocks. Afghanistan has repeatedly demonstrated a historical vulnerability to rapid regime change — often unfolding within months, if not weeks. Should the current internal pressures remain unaddressed, the risk of significant instability or chaos emerging in the coming months or early next year cannot be discounted. Such a development would carry serious security and strategic consequences for the wider region and for Eurasian stability.
